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32
go to the plant. I'm r.onstantly reminded when I look at the shipments on our dock
and see their final destinations.
There is no substitute for U.S. leadership on trade. The right policies on trade,
taxes and regulation are particulariy vital at a time of slowing economic growth. For
Purafil and other small-business exportels, we will continue to be successful only
jf we maintain our international customer base. In order to do that, we will depend
on the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. Thank you.

Chairman CRANE. Thank you, Mr. WeiHer. Mr. Tarullo?
STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. TARULLO, PROFESSOR,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER

Mr. TARULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that I endorse fully the emphasis of the rest of
the panel on the importance of U.S. leadership in trade policy. In
general terms, I also agree with the proposition that a proliferation
of bilateral and regional agreements to which the United States is
not party can adversely affect U.S. commercial interests. But my
point today is that the consensus on the desirability of U.S. leadership and justifiable concerns about trade agreements that exclude
the United States do not take us very far in determining an appropriate policy response. I say this for three reasons.
First, the fact that we can assume some damage to U.S. interests
from these agreements does not tell us how much damage is being
caused. Without more careful, systematic study, we will not have
the answer to this question. Aggregations of numbers of agreements and a compiling of anecdotes are a helpful starting point for
analysis, but they can be misleading. When one talks about the
number of bilateral investment treaties, for example, one has to
recognize that there are 15 different countries in the European
Union, each individually negotiating the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Moreover, it is very difficult to tell from the existence of
these treaties how much advantage, in fact, is accruing to the countries negotiating them.
As to anecdotes, there are always anecdotes about lost sales because of trade agreements and I am sure that most, if not all, of
them are accurate. But anecdotes alone do not tell us the overall
effects of a free trade area upon non-member States. We cannot i:ell
if the free trade area has promoted growth in the countries that
are members to it, so that there are more exports from the United
States and other non-membeL countries than would otherwise have
taken place. We cannot tell if patterns of world exports have shifted in response to the preferential tariff agreements but have not
resulted in much of a net change in world market share.
My second point is that even where preferential trade agreements are of concern and are clearly harming U.S. commercial interests, we cannot assume that a more activist U.S. trade policy
will necessarily blunt their effects. Some of these agreements exclude the United States not because of inaction on the part of the
United States, but because of an affirmative desire on the part of
some of the negotiating countries to exclude the United States.
These agreements are intended precisely to reduce U.S. influence,
an outgrowth of fears in some other countries of having international systems dominated by the world's remaining superpower.
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Now, these first two points do not, of course, mean that there is
no sensible trade negotiating agenda which the United States can
realistically pursue. Ultimately, the most important question before
the Congress and the public is not whether the United States
should undertake trade negotiations, but how and with what aim.
The day has long passed when trade agreements could be approached as a simple balancing of the interests of import-sensitive
industries with those of export-oriented industries and of consumers. The scope of trade agreements has so broadened in recent
years that important domestic policies, as well as commercial interests, are regularly implicated in trade policy decisions. For example, recent events underscore the inadequacy of international arrangements to protect food safety and animal health, even as trade
in food has been liberalized.
The Business Roundtable's report, which I assume was in part
the prompt for this hearing, quite rightly identifies the need to
build the national consensus that can form the basis of an agreed
mandate from the Congress. Whether one agrees or disagrees with
the Roundtable's specific ideas, one sh0uld applaud the desire to
engage on these issues. Indeed, those who most fear the costs of
trade agreements that exclude the United States should have the
greatest incentive to address the concerns of citizens who do not
stand to benefit directly from new trade agreements involving the
United States.
Let me close by trying to place trade negotiations in perspective.
As important as they are, they cannot on their own sustain U.S.
economic leadership or protect U.S. interests. I would like to suggest just two, rather different additional policies for the consideration of Congress and the administration to complement trade negotiations.
First, we do not need to be passive. I would like to echo Mr.
Levin in suggesting that the United States reconsider its position
of acquiescing in trade agreements concluded by the European
Union that may well violate WTO rules. Historically, there were
good foreign policy reasons for acquiescing in those agreements on
the European continent. But as Europe seeks preferential trade
agreements in other parts of the world, there seems to me no geopolitical or foreign policy reason to give the EU a free ride.
Second, and in conclusion, successful international leadership by
the United States requires more sustained attention at home and
abroad to those who have difficulty benefitting from increased
international trade. I think the members of the Committee are well
aware of the range of possibilities and I hope that you and the administration will continue to pay attention to them as you move
forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman CRANE. Thank you, Mr. Tarullo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tarullo follows:]
Statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center
Mr. Chainnan, Congressman Levin, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before
you today. I am currently a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. Formerly, as you know, I was Assistant to the President for International Economic
Policr I testify before you purely in my individual capacity as an academic, with
no chent interests or representation.
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This hearing was presumably prompted in part by a recent report of the Business
Roundtable entitled The Case for U.S. Trade Leadership: The United States is Falling Behind. Let me say at the outset that I endorse fully the Business Roundtable's
emphasis on the importance of U.S. leadership in trade policy, as in other inlernational economic matters. Constructive L .5. leadership maximizes the chances that
the prevailing forms of trade an'angements-regional and multilateral-will reflect
American values and promote American irlterests.
My testimony today is intended to show that consensus on the desirability of U.S.
leadership and observation of trade agreE,ments that exclude the United States do
not take us very far in deciding upon the best set of policy responses. First, we do
not have the kind of data that pennit evell a rough calculation of the potential hanu
to the United States from these agreements. Second, we need to recognize that some
of the actual or proposed agreements may be motivated precisely by the desire to
exclude the United States. Accordingly, even a highly active U.S. trade policy may
fail to derail them. Third, even if we all. agree that it is important to move forward
with trade agreements, the difficult question of our negotiating aims remains.
Thus the Roundtable's report is more a useful starting point for discussion than
the basis for action. Following an idEntification of the potential adverse effects on
the United States from other countries' trade agreements, I will clabol'ate on each
of the three points just noted. At the end of my testimony I wil! suggest two policies
beyond launching trade negotiations--one reactive and one proactive-that could
strengthen our international position.
Potential Adverse Effects of Agreements that Exclude the United States
In general tenus I agree with the proposition that a proliferation of bilateral and
regional agreements to which the United States is not party can adversely affect
U.s. commercial interests. These adverse effects come in three forms. First is the
well-known effect of trade diversion. Products from Country A that were not competitive against t.hose of Country Y when each faced a common tariff in Country B
may become competitive when Country A's products receive zero tariff treatment in
Country B as a result of a free trade area, but Country Y's products continue to
be subject to the tariff. Similarly, the harmonization of certain product standards
by members of a free trade 'lrea could operate to the detriment of producers from
non-member countries. Our concern here, of course, is that competitive U.S. exports
may lose market shares in other countries solely because they do not benefit from
tariff preferences or other benefits.
A second potential negative effect if< that a pattern of bilateral and regional agreements with features disadvant.ageous to the United States might continue to have
disadvantageous effects once multilateral negotiations get underway. The Business
Roundtable report contains several examples of possible patterns in bilateral and regional agreements that could set precedents the Roundtable believes to be undesirable. For example, the Roundtable fears that the limited coverage of agriculture in
free trade agreements concluded by the European Union with other countries may
create the view that agriculture is too sensitive to be subject to the normal international lules that govel'n trade. _
While a fairly broad U.S. consensus likely exists around the desirability of fully
including agriculture in trade negotiations, other concerns of the Roundtable about
precedent are more controversial. For example, the Roundtable cites as another bad
precedent certain provi<;ions in the EU-Mexico agreement that protect the privacy
of individuals in the dissemination of electronic data. Judging by public and Congressional discussion since passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. I suspect that many members of Congress would be more sympathetic to efforts to protect individual privacy.
A third possible negative effect ')f a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements is that. they may strengthen geopolitical ties among the members of
those arrangerrents so as to diminish U.S. influence with the member countries.
This possible neg'ltive effect is really the converse of the foreign policy gains that
some believe accrue to countries that conclude free trade agreements. It is, however,
very difficult to measure gains and losses in geopolitical influence, much less to separate out the effect of trade agreements from the many other factors that determine
the state of relations among nations.
Some Questions About the Costs of Agreements that Exclude the United
States
The existence of grounds for concern about the spread of agreements among U.S.
trading partners does not in itself yield prescriptions for policy. For one thing, the
fact that we can assume some damage to U.S. commercial and other interests does
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not tell us how much damage is being caused by these agreements, and thus how
urgently a policy response is needed.
There have nolr-at least to my knowledge-been any careful, systematic studies
in recent years of the economic costs to the United States of being excluded from
new trade agreements, though some may be underway. It is, of course, quite difficult to quantifY accurately the net effects of a free trade agreement, including effects on producers in non-member states. Anecdotes about specific lost sales following a trade agreement may be quite valid, but alone they do not tell us very
much. We do not, for example, know from such anecdotes whether there may simply
have been a reshuffling of supplier-consumer relations, so that U.S. suppliers are
selling more to countries which formerly were supplied by producers from the new
free trade area.
Furthermore, if the free trade area is a success and helps promote economic
growth in the participating countries, consumers in those countries may make purchases from U.s. firms that they would not otherwise have been able to make.
These purchases may be of altogether different goods or services from those which
suffered initially as a result of the free trade agrep'llent. Of course, no specific new
sales can be traced to the agreement the way lost sales can be linked to a tariff
disadvantage, so there are rarely countervailing ane<-dotes.
Because of the complexity of calculations that are 'lecessary to determine the net
economic effects of free trade areas and customs unions, empirical assessments have
yielded varyin~ results. While some economic studies ;,ave produced findings of statistically sigmficant relative increases in trade within various relPonal trade
groupings (as compared to their trade with the rest of the world), it \s very hard
to project accurately the impact of any single agreement. Moreover, the difficulties
in disentan~ling the specific effects a free trade agreement from other factors, such
'is acceleratlllg economic growth in geographically proximate countries, remain subl tantial. For example, one nllght expect accelerating growth in both Brazil and Ar~entina to rroduce increased bilateral tmde at a more rapid rate than that at which
th~ir globa trade increases, quite apart from the effects of a preferential trade arrang,~ment between them.
The Business Roundtable report does not claim to be an economic study. It is an
expression of concern by the organization's membership, which includes the nation's
largest exporters. The concenl is understandable, and the report has provoked a
useful discussion, including this hearing. But it would be misleading to conclude too
much from the raw numbers contained in the study. A couple of examples demonstrate this point:
• 'The report indicates that 33 percent of world exports is covered by preferential
trade arrangements concluded by the European Union, whereas only 11 percent of
world exports is covered by preferential trade arrangements to which the United
States is party. A look at the list of agreements concluded by the EU suggests that
the only way to reach the 33 percent figure is to include the Treaty of Rome itself.
That is, this number must include exports from Germany to Italy, as well as from
Germany to Latvia or Tunisia. Given that we now think of the EU as a single economic unit for trade purposes, the inclusion of such exports is accurate but not particularly meaningful.
• The report notes that as of January 2000 there are 1,857 bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) in the world, of which only 43 involve the United States. In the
1990s numerous emerging market and formerly communist countries went on a
kind of BIT binge, signing such agreements with just about any other country that
wished to do so. Thus, Argentina signed 53, including one with the United States.
The other 52 agreements do not "exclude" the United States-they simply provide
comparable protections for other countries. The report further notes that Western
European nations have negotiated 909 BITs. Again, these numbers are accurate, but
standing alone they do not tell the whole story. Because European nations negotiate
BITs individually, rather than through the European Union, there would need to
be 15 separate BITs to achieve the protection for all EU investors that a single BIT
provides U.S. investors. Furthermore, as the report itself indicates, Germany alone
has concluded 124 BITs, including with a number of very small countries that are
unlikely to host significant foreign investment.
The point of these examples is not to quibble with the report, but simply to caution that an inquiry into the potential negative impact on the United States requires
considerably more analysis than the aggregation of numbers of agreements and
anecdotes, useful as that may be as a starting point for a more extensive investigation. Again, I do not disagree with the proposition that some harm is likely to result
from proliferating trade and investment agreements to which the United States is
not party. I do believe that we are some ways from being able to identify the order
of magnitude of that harm.
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The Possibility of Competing Economic Blocs
One frequently-cited concern in recent years is that Europe and Asia are self-conflciously attempting to create economic "blocs" that exclurle the United States. Based
on the existence of Mercosur, some would add Latin America to the list of potential
regional blocs. Concerns along these lines are frequently exaggerated, though not
unfounded. More importantly, those who raise concerns about blocs sometimes erroneously conclude t.hat these tendencies are due primarily to the failure of the United
States to pursue an aggressive negotiating agenda in recent years, and that they
can be reversed if the United States pursues just such an agenda.
The European Union is itself a trading bloc, of course. In its external policies,
however, the EU is not so much attempting to extend an exclusive, regional bloc
as to extend its influence globally. Its free trade agreement with Mexico and its
overtures to Asian nations are two good examples. To be fair to the EU, these initiatives are in part !'esponses to American policy in NAFTA and APEC, respectively.
They are also, however, part of an emergin~ European challenge to U.s. leadership
in numerous areas, including trade. Europe s coherence as an intenlational actor is
still more latent than realized. But many European officials aspire to co-equal status with the United States. As a byprorl.uct of those aspirat.ions, they resist following
U.S. leadership and resent. occaoions when-as in the Balkans-they are nonetheles:! forced to do so. In these circumstances, it seems misguided to believe that U.S.
trade initiatives will substantially deflect European efforts.
The dynamic between America and Europe that produced the Kennedy, Tokyo,
and Uruguay rounds of trade negotiation was itself contentious at times. Even this
brand of cooperation is probably gone forever. Rather than believe we can turn back
the clock, it is more realistic to prepare ourselves for an extended period of friction
with Europe as we redefine our relationship in the pORt-Cold War era. With skill
and luck, our shared values will more than outweigh our sometimes diverging int.erests. But we should be under no illusion that Europe is simply waiting for us to
take up the mant!e of economic leadership and will then politely step aside.
Proposals for exclusively Asian economic arral1gements have issued fo!' decades.
Usually these proposals are not pursued. Even when they have been implemented,
as in the case of ASEAN, the member countries have remained quite o'ltward looking. Recent proposals for an approach based on exclusivity should be taken seriously, even though they are far from being realized. However, the very impube to
exclusivity contradicts the notion that a parallel U.S. or multilateral initiative will
deflect. t.hese efforts. Some countries in the region favor exclusivity because they
wish to confine the broad U.S. influence that comes from being the world's remaining fluperpower. Other countries are not antagonistic to the United States as such,
but believe they need to reach a rapprochement on Asian terms with other Asian
countries in order to achieve regional stability. To be effective, U.S. policies toward
Asia will have to be both patient and nuanced.
Concerns about Latin America have centered on Mercosur, an arrangement
among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (with Chile as an associate member). Mercosur began as a trade agreement, with aims for broader economic integration among the existing member~ and within Latin America as a whole. Yet even
those who support a stronger Mercosur as a countenveight to the United States appear to contemplate an eventual negotiation wit.h the United States (or, perhaps,
NAFTAl. Moreover, Mercosur has been weakened in the aftermath of Brazil's financial problems in 1998-1999. Most countIies in the region prefer closer economic ties
with t.he United States.
Trade Policy Decisions Remain
Notwithstanding my first two points, there is surely a sensible t.rade negotiating
agenda which the United States can realistically pursue. Ultimately. the moot impOltant question before the Congress and the public is not whether the United
States should undertake trade negotiations, but how and with what aims. The day
has long passed when trade agreements could be approached as a simple balancing
of the interests of import-sensitive industries with those of export-oriented industries and consumers. The scope of trade agreements has so broadened in recent
years that important domestic policies, as wdl as commercial interests, are regularly implicated in trade policy decisions. For example, recent events undersco:-e the
inadequacy of intemational arrangEments to protect food safety and animal health,
even as trade in food has been Iib'!ralized. Current. proposals for trade provisions
that would permit foreign investors to challenge non·discriminatory state and local
regulations, or tha~ could subordinate consumer protection aims in antitrust policy,
raise key issues of national policy.
The Business Roundtable s report quite rightly identifies the need to "build a nat.ional consensus that can form the basis of an agreed mandate from the Congress."
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In this spirit, the Roundtable goes on address labor and euvironmental issues and
to suggest some possible approaches to those issues. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Roundtable's specific ideas, one should embrace the Roundtable's
desire to seek a serious discussion on how to move forward. Indeed, those who most
fear the costs of other trade agreements should have the greatest incentive to address the concerns of citizens who do not stand to benefit directly from new t.rade
agreements involving the United States. Only if we confront the risks and costs attendant to trade and economic integration will we build the consensus that permits
full realization of the benefits that come from trade.
Some may respond that a trade policy agenda that pursues such aims, or that excludes ill-advised ideas like placing competitiOll policy in the WTO, will meet with
resistance among our triloing partners. Of course. some countries will resist some
U.s. negotiating aims and preferences. But this is true for commercial lltb~t.iating
aims as well. The task for Congress will be to devise an approach that can commanJ.
broad SUppOlt from the public. Moreover, there is no reason to think that-for example-labor and environment are qualitatively different from intellectual property.
product standards, or government procurement in the reception U.s. proposals will
elicit from other countries. Indeed, the U.s.-Jordan FTA has evidenced the willingness of a developing country to include labor and environment provisions in a trade
agreement. And the importance which the EU attaches to the "precautionary principle" assures that similar topics will be raised by other countries.
Policies to COl!1plement Trade Negotiations
My final point is that it is important. to place trade negotiations in perspective.
As import,ant as they are, they cannot on their own sustain U.S. economic leadership and )lrotect U.S. interests. Moreover, the difficulties in reaching domestic consensus and international agreement are such as to assure delay in achieving the desirable outcomes that trade negotiations can deliver. Let me close by commending
to the Congress and the Administration just two examples of policies to complement
trade negotiations.
I"irst, I suggest that the United States reconsider its position of acquiescing in
trade agreements concluded by the European Union that may well violate WTO
rules. Historically, the United Staws raised questions about the compatibility of free
trade agreements concluded by what was then the European Economic Community
with Article XXIV of the GATI'. The most important, but not the only. issue has
been whether certain of those agreements met the Article XXIV requirement that
"substantially all trade" be covered in a free trade area. While U.S. officials raised
these issues, they did not attempt to block working party reports on the free trade
areas in question. Nor has the United States invoked the dispute settlement provisions of the GATT or WTO to challenge any of these agreements. Within the U.S.
Government, this posture was justified by the geopolitical imperative of strengthening Western Europe during the Cold War. In the 1990s, geopolitics again counseled restraint as the gU concluded agreements with Central and Eastern European
countries, based on the reasoning that it was important to bring these new democracies closer to the established democracies of Western and SO'lthen:: Europe.
Today we are in substantially different circumstances. As the Bu.:;iness Roundtable report points out, the EU-Mexico agreement does not contain anything approaching complete coverage of agriculture. Presumably, the EU's intended agreement-' with South American countries will have similarly limited coverage. Insofar
as European Commission officials have explicitly stated their intention to "consolidate" their leading commercial position in South America through such agreements,
it seems to me that there is no strong geopolitical reason to acquiesce in possible
WTO violations.
This is not to say that the United States should immediately begin challenges to
one or more EU agreements. Nor is it to say that any of these is a clear violation.
In fact, the requirements of Article XXN have barely been developed in the GATT
and WTO. But the European Union should not have a free ride if it is evading multilateral rules ~overning the free trade areas it is concluding outside Europe. We
should make tHis policy position clear. Then, if and as appropriate, the Unit,ed
StatBs should challenge non-conforming agreements in the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, in dispute settlement proceedings, or both.
My second recommendation is hardly novel but, I believe crucial nonetheless. Successful international economic leadership by the United States requires more sustained attention, both at home and abroad, to those who wiII have difficulty benefi~
ting from increased international trade. At home we must take more seriously the
plight of workers, particularly un~ki\led and semi-skilled workers, who will be dislocated because of agreements that are beneficial to Americans as a whole. Mtldest
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programs for dislocated workers, usually passed ill an effort to move a particular
fast-track authorization or trade agreement, will not do the job.
Internationally, we must recognize how much our leadership suffers when we fail
to meet financial obligations to which we have already committed ourselves, or
when we only grudgingly contribute to development efforts for the poorest countries,
such as replenishing funds the International Development Association. I can testify
from experience as the President's "sherpa" in preparation for G-7 Summit meetings how much of my time was spent fending off criticism, even from our friends,
to the detriment of our efforts to advance our affirnlative agenda.
Beyond the simple but important responsibility of the United States as the world's
richest. nation to do its part in meeting global problems, a more generous and wellconceived development policy can yield benefits for our capacity and credibility as
a world leader. In some instances, there may also be ways to accomplish commercial
aims through technical and financial a3sistance and to do so with less rancor than
is often produced in trade negotiations. For instance, the Roundtable report mentions European and Japanese technical assistance programs for developing countries. One byproduct of such programs can be a leg up for companies from the assisting country, since the assistance is presumably compatible with standards developed
at home. While such advantages should not themselves drive decisions on technical
assistance, there is an obvious opportunity to serve commercial and genuine development needs simultaneously.
There are obviously many other possible complementary policies. While the merits
of anyone such policy can be the subject of good faith differences of view, it is disconcelting that, at a time when we are preparing to spend a good part of the budget
surplus anticipated in corning years, so little attention has been paid to the needs
or globalization's losers.
I thank you for your attention, and would be happy to answer any que&tions .

•
Chairman CRANE. We are going to be interrupted here shortly by
a couple of votes on the floor and we \vill recess, but we will wait
until the ",econd bells go off. In the interim, I have a question for
the entire panel.
Some have said that the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement is
a pl)litical document closely relate(: to the Middle East peace process. What do you see as the benefits and pitfalls of this agreement
from a trade perspective? Yes, Mr. Donohue?
Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, the total trade between the U.S.
and Jordan is less than $300 million. A great portion of that is
money that we give them to buy weapons from us. They are a very
important strategic country to us. We have hosted the King at the
Chamber on a number of occasions. But this agreement, which he
sought for strategic reasons, was then loaded up with the labor and
envIronmental provisions as a cost of getting the agreement and
was then sold to the labor unions and others as the template that
they would use for futme trade agreements. And to retract-there
is very little trade going on here.
If we decide that this is something strategically we should do,
then Congress is very able to take care of it. It was not done under
a fast track provision, so Congress can remove the defined template
of labor and environmental issues, which can and should be dealt
with in other ways, and pass the strategic agreement without any
delusion that it is a free trade agreement. There is no trade going
on.
And the Chamber and other members of the business community
will oppose this agreement if it contains those provisions, not because we have any problem with Jordan or with a free trade agree-

